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LEGAL ISSUES IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF A DEDICATED
SATELLITE FOR THE INDIAN NAVY
ANAND MOHAN*
INTRODUCTION
OON AFTER achieving independence from Great Britain in
1947, India recognized that a strong navy is imperative to
protect one's economic interests. Witness a quote attributed to
Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first premier: "To be secure on land,
we must be supreme at sea."1 Such an attitude, coupled with
India's dependence on oil transported by sea from the Persian
Gulf, has led to the natural evolution of the Indian Navy from a
primarily brown-water coastal defense force to today's fleet,
which has an impressive blue-water capability.' Some commen-
tators have even speculated that the Indian Navy could soon be-
come the third largest navy in the world.' Of late, the Indian
Navy has recognized that a pressing need exists to deploy dedi-
cated satellites to further naval capabilities, particularly in the
areas of communications and network-centric operations.
This article identifies and analyzes the legal issues that will
accompany the deployment of such space-based resources. Ac-
* Associate, McKee Nelson LLP;J.D. 2008, Georgetown University Law Center;
M.B.A. 1998, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; M.A. (Economics)
1996, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; B.A. 1994, University of
Delhi, India. The author is a FAA-rated commercial pilot and has extensive
personal knowledge of the Indian Navy. This article was submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the Juris Doctor degree. The author would
like to thank Prof. Paul B. Larsen and Colonel Philip A. Meek for their feedback
and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
I Arthur Herman, Op-Ed., The Eagle and the Elephant, WALL ST.J., Mar. 7, 2006,
available at http://www.indianembassy.org/newsite/News/US%20Media/2006/
68.asp.
2 See David Scott, India's Drive for a 'Blue Water' Navy, 10J. MIL. & STRATEGIC
STUD. 2, 1 (2007); see generally G.M. HIRANANDANI, TRANSITION TO EMINENCE: THE
INDIAN NAVY 1976-1990 XII (2007); SATYINDRA SINGH, BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER
(1992).
3 Robert D. Kaplan, Editorial, Lost at Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, at A19.
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cordingly, the article begins by attempting to visualize what the
Indian Navy might deploy in the way of space-based assets in the
next two decades and how it might do so. Parts I and II examine
the rationale behind the need for a dedicated naval satellite
against the backdrop of India's security needs and speculate on
what such a system might look like in practice. Part III moves to
the legal environment within which such a satellite would func-
tion. It discusses current domestic law that would impact the
production, deployment, and use of the Navy satellite. Part III.A
begins with the Indian Constitution to identify those provisions
that would be relevant to the operation of a satellite. Part III.B
examines statutory sources-particularly the Indian export con-
trol regime in force that would impact the development and use
of technology and material in a satellite. Finally, Part III.C takes
a quick look at the Charter of the Department of Space (DoS)
and the accompanying mandate of the Indian Space Research
Organization (ISRO). Part IV moves to a discussion of the inter-
national and customary law that could impact the operation of
the Navy satellite. Part IV.A looks at sources of binding interna-
tional law-treaties that India has signed-and Part IV.B looks
at non-binding sources of law and guidelines from international
agencies. The article concludes with a summary on the legal
viability of operating a dedicated Navy satellite and offers some
thoughts on the way ahead.
I. THE CASE FOR A DEDICATED NAVAL SATELLITE
It is generally accepted that the Indian Navy's primary peace-
time role is to safeguard maritime commerce, particularly to en-
sure that the sea lanes to the Persian Gulf are kept open so as to
allow oil from the Middle East to flow freely to meet the needs
of Indian industry.4 In a 1990 paper written for the U.S. Naval
War College Review, Captain Arun Prakash (later Admiral and
Chief of Naval Staff or CNS) made the case for an aircraft car-
rier force for the Indian Navy, citing the twin objectives of
power projection and sea denial in furtherance of the Navy's
role.' In view of the challenging security environment in the
Indian Ocean Region (IOR),6 it was perhaps inevitable that In-
4 SINGH, supra note 2, at 1.
5 A. Prakash, A Carrier Force for the Indian Navy, 43 NAVAL WAR C. Rv. 58, 62
(1990).
6 India faces security challenges from Pakistan to her west and from China to
her north and east. Since independence in 1947, India and Pakistan have gone
to war thrice (in 1947, 1965, and 1971) and waged a long and bloody proxy war
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dia would look to outer space as the next logical dimension
where it could deploy security assets.
7
As early as 2004, Admiral Prakash made public the Navy's aspi-
rations to become a leaner force with network-centric capabili-
ties.' He followed this up with a new Vision Document released
in May 2006 wherein he clearly stated the need to have a "tech-
nology enabled and networked force" to safeguard Indian mari-
time interests.9
Supporting the movement in this direction and citing the de-
velopment of the modern maritime battlefield, former CNS Ad-
miral Madhvendra Singh wrote the following in the 2006 Security
Research Review in support of a dedicated satellite for the Navy:
over the state of Kashmir, the latest episode of which culminated in the Kargil
conflict of 1999. See Global Security.org, Military, Wars, http://www.global-
security.org/military/world/war/past.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). India also
lost a war to China in 1962 and border disputes over the Aksai Chin area remain
a bone of contention between the parties to this day. See id. The Chinese Navy
has begun moving out of the South China Sea region, which was its traditional
stomping ground, to move westward, setting up bases in the Coco Islands near
the Straits of Malacca on a long-term lease from Myanmar. See China's Ambitions
in Myanmar, ASIA PACIFIC MEDIA SERVICES LIMITED, http://www.asiapacificms.
com/articles/myanmar-influence/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). China is assisting
Pakistan with the development and build-out of a new deep water port at Gwadar
on the Makaran coast. See Abdus Sattar Ghazali, India Alarmed as Chinese Built
Gwadar Port of Pakistan Becomes Operational, COUNTERCURRENTS, Feb. 8, 2008,
http://www.countercurrents.org/ghazali080208.htm. Both projects are at strate-
gic chokepoints-most merchant traffic to Singapore and the far east flows
through the Straits of Malacca and Gwadar, at the mouth of the Straits of Hor-
muz, that controls the oil traffic from the Persian Gulf. See id. Western navies,
too, have a new found interest in the IOR. Even during the Cold War, the super-
powers maintained a presence in the Indian Ocean and the United States has a
permanent base at Diego Garcia to this day. See U.S. Navy Support Facility Diego
Garcia, http://www.dg.navy.mil/web/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). After the 1991
Gulf War, western navies have maintained a year-round presence in the Persian
Gulf.
7 A 2006 Indian publication opines: "As we move forward in the 21st century it
is inevitable that space will become another medium of warfare besides assuming
the important role of protecting the country's commercial assets in this me-
dium." Jasjit Singh, Introduction to K.K. NAMR, SPACE: THE FRONTIERS OF MODERN
DEFENCE ix (2006).
8 See Vijay Sakhuja, Change But Continuity: The Indian Navy Marches Ahead, Aug.
10, 2004, http://wv.ipcs.org/article-details.php?articleNo=1457; Indian Navy
Will Become Leaner and Meaner, Nov. 4, 2004, http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/
nov/04navy.htm.
9 INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEF. (NAVY), THE INDIAN
NAVY'S VISION DOCUMENT 3 (2006), available at http://www.indiannavy.nic.in/vi-
sion.pdf.
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The maritime battle space is becoming transparent and much
larger due to the extended ranges of weapons and sensors and
reaction times are getting shorter. It is vital that the exchange of
information and communications between units is speeded up.
While units in close formation are all networked, dispersed for-
mations must use the HF communication band for networking,
which gives away their position. It is, therefore, absolutely essen-
tial that a Navy-ISRO partnership is forged to put dedicated Na-
val satellites in orbit to network all units and shore headquarters.
This is imperative for a 21st century Navy operating well away
from its shores."
As recently as December 2007, current CNS Admiral Sureesh
Mehta made it clear that the Navy is dedicated to developing a
satellite-based broadband capability for the twin purposes of en-
hanced communications and network-centric warfare. "
According to the foregoing, the Navy's argument for a dedi-
cated satellite seems to be based, at least in part, on the need to
maintain its competitive edge in the battlefield as a result of the
evolution of the weapon systems of competing powers in the
10R. In particular, the deployment of submarine-launched
cruise missiles by Pakistan is of concern to the Indian Navy in as
much as this impacts its ability to project power, protect mari-
time commerce, and engage in effective sea denial.
Further, the speed of incoming missiles requires early detec-
tion and effective coordinated counter measures to be success-
ful in avoiding crippling damage to fleet combatants. Aerial
assets are used by the Navy in the airborne early warning
(AEW), surveillance, and targeting roles with some success, 2
10 Madhvendra Singh, The Indian Navy in 2020, 2 SECURITY REs. REV. 2 (2006),
available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/2006/02/56.html.
H See R.M. Anand, Top Brass Interview: Admiral Sureesh Mehia, ADJ, Dec. 2007,
available at http://www.shpmedia.com/Images/ADJ%2ODec%202007_Indian%
20Navy%2OChief%2Olnterview.pdf.
12 The Indian Navy uses ship-based Kamov Ka-31 helicopters in a limited air-
borne, surveillance, and targeting role. The Ka-31 has an advanced data-linking
suite capable of secure communications within a 150 kilometer range, between
4,950 and 11,000 feet. Bharat Rakshak, Kamov Ka-31, http://www.bharat-rak-
shak.com/NAVY/aviation/aircraft/124-kamov-ka-31.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2009). The helicopter also comes with SATCOM, a Kronstadt Abris 12-channel
GPS receiver, and an on-board navigation system capable of ground proximity
warning, obstacle approach warning, auto-navigation of preprogrammed routes,
auto homing onto and landing at the parent carrier/base, and flight stabilization.
See Kamov Ka-31, http://wv.aviastar.org/helicopters-eng/ka-31.php (last vis-
ited Jan. 24, 2009). It can be used to provide over-the-horizon targeting for Klub
and Brahmos cruise missiles. See id.
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but an effective long-term solution requires a platform that is
capable of greater battlefield coverage with a longer time on sta-
tion, i.e., a platform that is not limited by the need to re-fuel. A
satellite would seem to be the natural choice for such a task.
II. POSSIBLE SCOPE AND ELEMENTS OF
THE NAVY SATELLITE SYSTEM
From the statements of senior naval officers above, it is evi-
dent that at least for the next few years, the Indian Navy's space
ambitions remain limited to using satellites dedicated to en-
hancing the quality and quantity of data throughput for ship-to-
ship and ship-to-shore communications. Naturally, enhanced
communications can be expected to reduce the sensor-to-
shooter response time and ultimately enhance the war-fighting
capability of the fleet.
The Indian Navy's space component of its network-centric
warfare plan is comparatively modest when compared to the
plans of other nations like the United States. The U.S. model,
for instance, employs multiple GPS satellites and other space-
based assets to provide real-time surveillance, navigation, com-
munication, and targeting capabilities to dominate the
battlefield.
As a first step towards network-centric operations, the Indian
Navy is building a Navy Enterprise Wide Network of high-speed
computers capable of linking sensors and weapons to compo-
nents of the fleet.'3 This comprises the ground-based segment
of the Navy's space-based asset architecture. A second necessary
element of a space-based architecture is an uplink/downlink
segment. Some uplink/downlink capability already exists (e.g.,
the Ka-31 AEW platform currently in use for data-linking), so
the Navy currently has in place the core elements of two of the
three segments necessary for a true space-based asset
architecture.
However, to truly realize its vision of a networked force the
Navy needs a third and final element. It needs at least one dedi-
cated communications satellite in geostationary orbit with ade-
quate bandwidth to allow for real-time surveillance and
targeting. Although the Navy is working with the ISRO to bring
13 Arunkumar Bhatt, Navy Building High-Speed Data Network, HINDU, Dec. 6,
2004, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/2004/12/06/stories/20041206
02511200.htm.
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this vision to reality, 4 to date no such dedicated satellite is in
operation. The issues appear to be budgetary rather than tech-
nical, given the ISRO's proven expertise in developing and
launching twenty INSAT telecommunications satellites between
1982 and 2007, ten of which are in active service. 5
III. SPACE LAW IN INDIA
For a country that prides itself on having what is the longest
written constitution in the world, 6 there is surprisingly little do-
mestic law regulating the use of outer space or activities
therein. 17 However, India is not totally devoid of law on the sub-
ject matter; many provisions of the Indian Constitution and do-
mestic non-proliferation statutes are relevant.
A. THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
Like most constitutions, the Constitution of India is primarily
concerned with addressing fundamental political principles and
establishing the structure, procedures, powers, and duties of the
government. The primary relevance of the Indian Constitution to
the operation and use of a satellite is in the areas of interna-
tional law and property rights.
The Indian Constitution imposes on the state the obligation to
strive for the "promot[ion of] international peace and security,"
including "maintain [ing] just and honourable relations between
14 See Sakhuja, supra note 8.
15 INDIAN SPACE RESEARCH ORG. [ISRO], LAUNCH OF INSAT-4CR By GEOSYN-
CHRONOUS SATELLITE LAUNCH VEHICLE 8 (2007), available at http://www.isro.org/
pressrelease/background-GSLV-F04.pdf.
16 Indianetzone, Indian Administration, http://www.indianetzone.com/2/
constitutionindia.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
17 Dr. V. Balakista Reddy, Professor of Law at NALSAR University of Law in
India, speaking on January 17, 2008 at the Second International Conference on
the State of Remote Sensing Law, stated "that the Indian legal regime does not
have 'a law for regulation of India[n]' space activities." Second Int'l Conference
on the State of Remote Sensing Law: India, http://rescommunis.wordpress.com/
2008/01 / 17/second-international-conference-on-the-state-of-remote-sensing-law-
india/ (Jan. 17, 2008, 15:31 EST). This, in his view, was a defect that needs to be
remedied in light of the increasing commercialization and privatization of re-
mote sensing activities. See id.; V. Balakista Reddy, India and Space Laws: A Millen-
nium Perspective, HINDU, Mar. 9, 2000, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/
2000/03/09/stories/08090008.htm ("Space and space-related matters in India
are regulated by legal rules belonging to different areas of the Indian domestic
law, since there is no special space legislation."); Shashi Sharma, Space Program
and Business in India-Legal Perspectives 7-10 (Berkeley Electronic Press, Working
Paper No. 1923, 2007) available at http://aw.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1923.
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nations," "respect for international law and treaty obligations,"
and "settlement of international disputes by arbitration."18 It
also provides that the executive power of the state extends "to
the matters with respect to which [the Indian] Parliament has
power to make laws" and includes "such rights, authority and
jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India by
virtue of any treaty or agreement."1 The Indian Parliament
may enact laws on subjects enumerated in the Union list or the
Concurrent (residual) list, but not the State list.20 "Space" is not
enumerated in the Union list.21 However, Article 253 of the
Constitution empowers the Parliament to make any law for India
to implement treaties, international agreements, and conven-
tions.22 Matters relating to outer space would be covered by Ar-
ticle 253 because India has signed a number of international
treaties in this area.
On the issue of property rights, the Indian Constitution guaran-
tees a due process general right to property, stating that "[n]o
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of
law."' 23 This right, granted to individuals, is limited by a savings
clause under Article 31A, Clause 1 (b), which provides that "the
taking over of the management of any property by the State for
a limited period either in the public interest or in order to se-
cure the proper management of the property" shall not be per se
void.24
Of more relevance to the government operation of a military
satellite is Article 285, Clause 1, of the Constitution which pro-
vides that "It]he property of the Union shall, save in so far as
Parliament may by law otherwise provide, be exempt from all
taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a State. 25
This simply makes any federally-owned satellite free from state
taxation. Given India's political system of strong central govern-
ance, notwithstanding states' rights, the practical ramifications
of this are very limited.
18 INDIA CONST. art. 51.
19 Id. art. 73.
20 Id. arts. 246, 248.
21 See id. Seventh Schedule.
22 Id. art. 253.
23 Id. art. 300A.
24 Id. art. 31A.
25 Id. art. 285.
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B. RELEVANT INDIAN STATUTES
When the international community discusses non-prolifera-
tion, India is often faulted for steadfastly refusing to sign such
agreements as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),26 the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 27 and the Wassenaar Ar-
rangement.28 One might argue that India is a weak link in the
international non-proliferation regime. The Indian response is
two-fold:
(a) From a diplomatic standpoint, India refuses to be a signa-
tory to what it perceives as a discriminatory regime. The
true solution according to India is to do away with weap-
ons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems, not
to selectively allow early adopters to continue deploying
such systems while denying their use to other parties.29
(b) India has a sophisticated system of governmental controls
that maintain strict control over exploration, research,
imports, and exports of fissile minerals and technology.
The system also maintains direct or indirect control of
research, development, and production of almost all de-
fense-related items, ranging from guns and ordnance to
missiles and major combat platforms. The Government
of India (Gol) believes that the effective enforcement of
this regime is sufficient to safeguard against prolifera-
tion.30 Note, however, that in the wake of India's eco-
nomic reforms, commentators have suggested that the
regime in its current form is not as secure as it once was,
pointing to private enterprise ventures in the area of
outer space.3'
26 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
27 The Missile Technology Control Regime, http://www.mtcr.info/english/in-
dex.html [hereinafter MTCR] (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
28 Wassenaar Arrangement, Participating States, http://www.wassenaar.org/
participants/index.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
29 See Embassy of India, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, http://www.indianem-
bassy.org/policy/CTBT/embassy-non-proliferation.htm (last visited Sept. 19,
2008).
30 See Seema Gahlaut, Export Control Developments in India, in MICHAEL BECK, ET
AL., To SUPPLY OR TO DENY: COMPARING NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS IN
FIVE KEY COUNTRIES 143 (2003). See generally SEEMA GAHLAUT & ANuPAM SR1VAS-
TAVA, CTR. FOR INT'L TRADE & SEC., NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS IN IN-
DIA (2005), available at http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/CITS%201ndia
%20WV.pdf.
31 See GAHLAUT & SRIVASTAVA, supra note 30, at 5 ("The government is now
seeking more private-sector participation in the development, production, and
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India does not have a unified export control law; any import
or export of space technology for the deployment of satellites
will be governed by the Foreign Trade (Development and Regu-
lation) Act of 1992 (FTDR).32 The FTDR controls the exports of
all materials including dual-use materials and technology.3 3 Fur-
ther, the Gol's Export-Import (EXIM) policy published by the
Ministry of Commerce is derived from Section 5 of the FTDR.34
The Gol clarifies its EXIM policy in the following documents:
(a) Export and Import Policy 1, April 2002-March 31, 2007;
(b) Handbook of Procedures, Vol. I;
(c) Handbook of Procedures, Vol. II, Standard Input-Output and
Value Addition Norms; and
(d) ITC (HS), Classification of Export and Import Items. 5
All items for export or import must be licensed by the Direc-
torate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT).36 "Sensitive items,
and the conditions under which they can be exported, have now
been consolidated on a list called SCOMET, or Special Chemi-
cals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies, which
also lists the conditions under which export licenses will be
granted for these items."37 Under SCOMET, items of (i) Avion-
ics and Navigation, (ii) Aerospace materials, equipment, systems
and related technologies, and (iii) Electronics, computers, and
information technology fall into categories 4, 5, and 7 respec-
tively, all of which require licenses from the DGFT .3  Category 4
and 5 materials specifically include "maraging steel, composite
structures, rocket propellants, metal fuels, pulsed electron accel-
erators, guidance systems, and [other] techn-ologies that are
clearly associated with the production and guidance of rockets
[and] satellites. 31 9 Therefore any foreign procurement of tech-
nology or materials for the Navy satellite must be approved and
marketing of a range of dual-use technologies. This will tend to weaken govern-
ment control over exports of such technologies."); Boeing, ISRO to Make, Market
Satellites, REDIFF, June 22, 2004, http://www.rediff.com/money/2004/jun/22boe-
ing.htm.
32 GAHLAUT & SRIVASTAVA, supra note 30, at 11.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 12.
36 Id. at 20.
37 Id. at 13.
- Id. at 14 (summarizing information from Appendix 3, Schedule II of the
ITC (HS) Classification of Export and Import Items, 2004-2009).
39 Id. at 15.
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brought in under this regime before it is available for integra-
tion into a satellite.
C. DEPARTMENT OF SPACE CHARTER AND ISRO MANDATE
All matters pertaining to science and technology in India are
administered by the Ministry of Science and Technology within
the GoI.4° This Ministry in turn has delegated responsibility for
the administration, development, and conduct of space activities
to the DoS.4 1
The DoS has published the Citizens' Charter of Department of
Space (Charter)42 which may reasonably be interpreted to be simi-
lar to an enabling statute. The DoS states in the Charter that it
"has the primary responsibility for promoting development and
application of space science and technology to assist in all round
development of the nation."43 The Charter lists the programs
that the Department has evolved to date.44 The INSAT program
for telecommunications and the design and indigenous develop-
ment of launch vehicles, spacecraft, and communications tech-
nologies are given special mention.4 5 The Department states
that it is committed to providing various satellite services to the
central government (which logically includes the Navy under
the Ministry of Defense) and specifically mentions that it will
"[p] rovide required transponders and facilities to meet the com-
munication, television broadcasting and security requirement of
our country [and] . . . [p]rovide adequate earth observation ca-
pability in multiple spectral, spatial and temporal resolutions."46
IV. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Compared to the relative paucity of domestic law, interna-
tional law provides a wealth of sources that are relevant to the
deployment and operation of a Navy satellite by India. Broadly
speaking, such sources fall into two categories: international
treaties that are binding on India in as much as India is a signa-
4o Introduction, Dep't of Science & Tech., http://dst.gov.in/aboutUS/intro_
DST.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
41 See ISRO, About ISRO, http://v.isro.org/about-isro.htm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2009).
42 See ISRO, CITIZENS' CHARTER OF DEPARTMENT OF SPACE, available at http://
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tory to them and other treaties and agreements that may be re-
garded as customary or non-binding law because India has not
signed them.
A. BINDING SOURCES OF LAW
India is a signatory to the following treaties that would impact
the deployment and operation of a putative Navy satellite. Con-
sequently, the legal issues raised in each treaty deserve a de-
tailed examination.
1. 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty
or OST)f
Article V of the OST proscribes the placement in Earth orbit
of "any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction." '4 8 Provided that the putative satel-
lite has no sources of nuclear power, it will be completely ex-
empt from the ambit of Article V. Even the use of an on-board
nuclear power source does not make the satellite the equivalent
of a WMD in outer space,4 9 although the United Nations does
provide some non-binding safety guidelines on the use of such
power sources in its Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power
Sources in Outer Space.5° Of particular interest is Principle 3
(Guidelines and Criteria for Safe Use). Subject to the safety
strictures of Clause 1, Clause 2 allows the use of nuclear reactors
on space objects if they are operated in sufficiently high-Earth
orbits so as to allow for substantial decay of fissionable material
over the orbital lifetime of the object or operated in low-Earth
orbit and subsequently moved to high orbits at the end of their
operational mission.5' Provided that adequate safeguards are
adopted in design and operation, the use of a nuclear power
47 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter OST].
48 Id. art. IV.
49 E-mail from Philip A. Meek, Associate General Counsel (International Af-
fairs), U.S. Air Force, to Anand Mohan, Georgetown University Law Center (Apr.
23, 2008, 10:23:00 EST) (on file with author).
50 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space,
G.A. Res. 47/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992).
51 Id. 3(a)-(b). Principle 9 (Liability and Compensation) notes that liabil-
ity still attaches to the launching State. Id. 9(1).
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source onboard the Navy satellite is not absolutely forbidden.
Even if this is not a factor, Article IV52 raises a further question:
could the satellite be considered a WMD, or a necessary part of a
WMD system, by virtue of its ability to provide superior targeting
to missile systems that might carry a WMD payload? There ap-
pears to be no definitive answer in the law, although arguments
can obviously be made for either position. Provided the satellite
is primarily employed in a communications, surveillance, or
force-multiplier role, the stronger argument appears to be that
the satellite itself cannot be a WMD.
Article VI of the OST assigns to treaty parties "international
responsibility for national activities" carried on in outer space by
governmental entities.53 Since the Navy satellite would be devel-
oped and launched by the DoS/ISRO entities and operated by
the Indian Navy, all of which are governmental entities, it is
clear that Article VI operates to hold India responsible for any
activities in connection with the Navy satellite.
Article VII of the OST assigns international liability to India
(and to any State Party launcher, if India does not itself launch
the satellite) for any damage resulting from the satellite or its
components in air space or outer space.54
Article VIII requires India to maintain jurisdictional control
over the satellite while in outer space and gives India the right to
claim the satellite and/or its component parts in the event of its
return to Earth beyond the territorial limits of India.55
2. 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, The Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (Rescue Agreement) 6
The Rescue Agreement expands on Articles V and VIII of the
OST. It primarily provides that States shall take all possible
steps to rescue and assist astronauts in distress and promptly re-
turn them to the launching State.57 Of greater importance to
India in its satellite launching and operation endeavor is the
agreement enshrined in Article V whereby States shall, upon re-
52 OST, supra note 47, art. IV.
53 Id. art. VI.
54 Id. art. VII.
55 Id. art. VIII.
56 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 674
U.N.T.S. 2121.
57 See generally id.
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quest, provide assistance to launching States in recovering space
objects that return to Earth outside the territory of the launch-
ing State. 58 Given the potentially sensitive technology that may
be embedded in its Navy satellite, the prompt return of a
crashed satellite can be expected to be of particular concern to
India.5"
3. 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects (Liability Convention)6"
The Liability Convention elaborates on Article VII of the OST
to provide that a launching State, defined as a "State which
launches or procures the launching of a space object" or a
"State from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched, ' 61 "shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for
damage caused by its space object on the surface of the [E]arth
or to aircraft,"62 and liable for damage due to its faults in
63 Cospace. The Convention also provides for procedures for the
settlement of claims for damages. 64 India has launched satellites
58 Id. art. V, cl. 3.
59 Several liability and security issues result from the use of nuclear power
sources. While the use of nuclear power sources would not be absolutely forbid-
den, the loss of such a satellite and its prompt return would be of particular
concern for intelligence and non-proliferation reasons. It is logical that India
would not want sensitive, nuclear technology falling into the hands of an un-
friendly State. Another concern, from a liability perspective, would be the poten-
tial damage caused by the radiation fallout from such a satellite. The case of the
Russian Cosmos 954 crash in 1979 illustrates the environmental and liability con-
cerns of such a potential accident. See Carl Q. Christol, International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 346, 346-47 n.2 (1980). Also
instructive is the reason cited by the United States in its Feb. 20, 2008 shoot-down
of a disabled U.S. spy satellite. See e.g., Military.com, US: Satellite Shoot-Down
Not Offensive, http://vw.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,162169,00.html
(last visited Sept. 18, 2008). The United States declared it was concerned that
1,000 lbs. of toxic hydrazine fuel on board could harm populations on the
ground if the satellite were allowed to de-orbit in an uncontrolled fashion. Id.
Therefore, it chose to proactively destroy the satellite in a controlled firing. Id.
Other nations have claimed that this was simply an excuse for the United States
to test its anti-satellite capabilities. See e.g., Marc Kaufman & Walter Pincus, Effort
to Shoot Down Satellite Could Inform Military Strategy, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2003, at
A3, available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2 0 0 8 /0 2/ 2 0/
ST2008022001495.html.
60 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
61 Id. art. I(c).
62 Id. art. II.
63 Id. art. III.
64 See generally id.
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in the past from its facility at Sriharikota; it has also procured
launches from other States.65 Regardless of which method India
chooses to launch the putative Navy satellite, India will be liable
under the Liability Convention to injured parties of other States
for damage if any, resulting from the launch and operation of
the satellite.
a. The Issue of Liability for Third Party Use
What if India allows another State to use the satellite for mili-
tary purposes and damages occur because of the actions of the
user State? Under international law, such consent and use
could be interpreted as an act of war by India and the user State
against another State.66 Assuming for the moment that the
question is limited to one of civil damages, if the damages are
actual or direct, there is established international case law that
could find India liable for such damage, perhaps jointly and sev-
erally with the other user State.67 However, a plaintiff might
find it hard to state a case against India, if the damages occur as
a result of acts that are in express violation of prohibitions or
limitations by India. On the question of indirect damage, i.e.,
consequential damage that is attenuated from the actual act
causing the damage, the Liability Convention is less clear. The
Convention denies recovery for damage resulting from conse-
quential connections to space activity68 and only briefly discusses
65 See Sriharikota Space Center, http://fas.org/spp/guide/india/facility/
shar.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008); Gary Milhollin, India's Missiles-With a Little
Help From Our Friends, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS (1989), available at http://wiscon-
sinproject.org/pubs/articles/1989/indiasmissiles-dodging.htm.
66 Under the United Nations Charter, only self-defense, defense of an ally
under a mutual defense pact, or an action sanctioned by the U.N. are legal cause
for war. U.N. Charter art. 51. A plaintiff-state might be able to show that the use
of the satellite does not fall under any of these justifications and is therefore an
act of war.
67 See Christol, supra note 59, at 352-53, citing the Corfu Channel case which
held that there is an obligation of every state not to allow its territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other states and the Trail Smelter arbitration that
established the duty to pay monetary damages for identified harm to property.
Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4 (Apr. 9); Convention Between
the United States of America and the Dominion of Canada Relative to the Estab-
lishment of a Tribunal to Decide Questions of Indemnity and Future Regime
Arising From the Operation of Smelter at Trail, British Columbia, Apr. 15, 1935,
49 Stat. 3245, 162 L.N.T.S. 73.
68 Christol, supra note 59, at 360 (citing STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AERONAU-
TICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, 92D CONG., REPORT ON CONVENTION ON INTERNA-
TIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS 24 (Comm. Print 1972)).
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indirect damage.6 9 Further, during the Liability Convention Le-
gal Subcommittee discussion, India specifically stated its prefer-
ence that the question not be addressed in the Convention, but
instead be left open to be dealt with as individual cases arose.70
In the event of indirect damage, it is probable that a court
would first look at the totality of circumstances to see if an award
should be made at all and then decide on an apportionment
and award of damages against India and the user State if it is
reasonably warranted by the circumstances.
4. 1976 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (Registration Convention)7"
The Registration Convention allows the U.N. Secretariat to
maintain a registry of all objects launched by member States
into outer space." Launching States that are signatory to the
Registration Convention should furnish, as soon as practicable,
the following information concerning each space object:
* Name of launching State;
" An appropriate designator of the space object or its registra-
tion number;
* Date and territory or location of launch;
* Basic orbital parameters, including:
a. Nodal period (the time between two successive north-
bound crossings of the equator-usually in minutes);
b. Inclination (inclination of the orbit-polar orbit is
ninety degrees and equatorial orbit is zero degrees);
c. Apogee (highest altitude above the Earth's surface-in
kilometers);
d. Perigee (lowest altitude above the Earth's surface-in
kilometers);
* General function of the space object.7 3
69 Id. at 361.
70 Id. (citing W.F. Foster, The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, 10 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 137, 158 n.65 (1972)).
71 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer SpaceJan. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
72 Id. art. III.
73 Id. According to the Space Security 2007 Report
A lack of timelines for compliance remains a shortcoming of the
Registration Convention. While information is to be provided "as
soon as practicable," it might not be provided for weeks or months,
if at all. For example, by 2001, the US had failed to register 141 of
its over 2,000 satellite payloads. The compliance of other signato-
ries is equally poor.
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India has provided such information to the U.N. for all
launches since 1975 and will likely do so for the putative Navy
satellite. 4 It should be noted that the Registration Convention
only requires that the U.N. be notified of initial basic orbital pa-
rameters. 75 While an up-to-date registry would aid member
States to see and avoid each other's space assets, providing de-
tailed orbit data in a public forum may not be in the best inter-
ests of a member State deploying a military asset. This could
make it that much easier for a hostile nation to target that satel-
lite. It is common practice for nations to "kick boost" their satel-
lites to different orbits and locations for any variety of reasons,
including operational security, secrecy, etc. Moving satellites in
such a manner does not conflict with the reporting require-
ments of the Registration Convention.76
SPACESECURITY.ORG, SPACE SECURITY 2007 42 (2007), available at http://www.space
security.org/SS12007.pdf.
74 Some countries maintain national registries of space objects launched in ad-
dition to the U.N. Registry, often as part of domestic law. See, e.g., U.S. Space
Objects Registry, http://169.253.2.103/oes/index.cfm?fuseaction=home (last vis-
ited Sept. 20, 2008); United Kingdom Registry of Space Objects, http://www.
parliament.uk/deposits/depositedpapers/2008/DEP2008-0444.doc (last visited
Sept. 20, 2008). India does not maintain any such national registry even though
it has launched space objects for other nations. The closest object to a registry
that India can claim is a partial list of launched objects maintained by ISRO on its
web site. See ISRO, Indian National Satellite System (INSAT), http://www.isro.
org/programmes.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). By selecting any hyperlink on
this site, users can view salient features of each satellite, comparable to the data in
the U.N. Registry.
75 Valery Loshchinin, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation, Remarks at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference of Disarmament
(Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.geneva.mid.ru/speeches/39.html. Note also that
any satellite, including a military satellite, must be registered with the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union in order to obtain an orbital slot and a cleared
radio frequency. See Adam G. Quinn, The New Age of Space Law: The Outer Space
Treaty and the Weaponization of Space, 17 MrNN.J. INT'L L. 475, 501 (2008); Dean N.
Reinhardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, 72J. AIR L. & Com. 65, 99 n.257
(2007); Int'l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Constitution of the International Telecommu-
nication Union, art. 1(2)(a), available at http://www.itu.int/net/about/basics-
texts/index.aspx. In conjunction with the Registration Convention, this would
mitigate to a large extent any shortcomings of the Registration Convention. A list
of active, dedicated military satellites is also found at Annex 2 of the Space Security
2007 Report. SPACESECURITY.ORG, supra note 73, at 152.
76 See Loshchinin, supra note 75.
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5. International Telecommunications Union (ITU)7
The orbit and movement of a satellite is controlled from
Earth through the use of radio signals, so an analysis of the legal
provisions of the ITU is of critical importance to the operation
of any satellite. As the Preamble to the ITU states, the establish-
ment of efficient telecommunication services is a primary objec-
tive of the Convention of the International Telecommunications
Union.78 The following are the key relevant provisions of the
ITU:
a. Article 1: Purposes of the Union
Particular purposes of the ITU include:
a) [to] effect allocation of bands of the radio-frequency spec-
trum, the allotment of radio frequencies and the registration of
radio-frequency assignments and, for space services, of any associ-
ated orbital position in the geostationary-satellite orbit or of any
associated characteristics of satellites in other orbits, in order to
avoid harmful interference between radio stations of different
countries;79
b) [to] coordinate efforts to eliminate harmful interference be-
tween radio stations of different countries and to improve the
use made of the radio-frequency spectrum for radiocommunica-
tion services and of the geostationary-satellite and other satellite
orbits; °
e) [to] coordinate efforts to harmonize the development of tele-
communication facilities, notably those using space techniques,
with a view to full advantage being taken of their possibilities.
s
b. Article 7: Structure of the Union
The ITU is to be comprised of "the Plenipotentiary Confer-
ence, which is the supreme organ of the [ITU]; the Council,
which acts on behalf of the Plenipotentiary Conference . . .
[and] the Radiocommunication Sector, including world and re-
gional radiocommunication conferences, radiocommunication
assemblies and the Radio Regulations Board."8 2
77 See generally Int'l Telecomm. Union, http://wvw.itu.int/aboutitu/basic-
texts/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2008).
78 ITU, supra note 75, at pmbl.
- Id. art. 1 (2) (a).
80 Id. art. 1 (2) (b).
81 Id. art. 1 (2) (e).
82 Id. art. 7.
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c. Article 10: The Council
The Council shall take all steps to facilitate the implementation
by the Member States of the provisions of [the ITU] Constitu-
tion, of the Convention, of the Administrative Regulations, of the
decisions of the Plenipotentiary Conference, and, where appro-
priate, of the decisions of other conferences and meetings of the
[ITU], and perform any duties assigned to it by the Plenipotenti-
ary Conference. 8
d. Article 12: Radiocommunication Sector: Functions and
Structure
The functions of the Radiocommunication Sector shall be, bear-
ing in mind the particular concerns of developing countries, to
fulfill the purposes of the Union, as stated in Article 1 of this
Constitution, relating to radiocommunication: by ensuring the
rational, equitable, efficient and economical use of the radio-fre-
quency spectrum by all radiocommunication services, including
those using the geostationary-satellite or other satellite orbits,
subject to the provisions of Article 44 of this Constitution, and by
carrying out studies without limit of frequency range and adopt-
ing recommendations on radiocommunication matters .... The
Radiocommunication Sector shall work through the Radio Regu-
lations Board. 4
Any new satellite launched by India into geostationary orbit
would require a radio control frequency assigned by the ITU or
the Council. The frequency would have to be recorded and ad-
ministered by the Radio Regulations Board to ensure minimum
interference from conflicting local signals and safe operation of
the Indian satellite.
e. Article 44: Use of the Radio-Frequency Spectrum and of
the Geostationary-Satellite and other Satellite Orbits
Consistent with the drive for efficient use of the finite radio
frequency spectrum, ITU Article 44 requires members to:
[E]ndeavour to limit the number of frequencies and the spec-
trum used to the minimum essential to provide in a satisfactory
manner the necessary services [and] ... apply the latest technical
advances as soon as possible .... In using frequency bands for
radio services, Member States shall bear in mind that radio fre-
quencies [and the geostationary satellite orbit] are limited natu-
ral resources and that they must be used . . . efficiently and
83 Id. art. 10(4).
84 Id. arts. 12(1), (2)(b).
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economically, in conformity with the provisions of the Radio Reg-
ulations, so that countries or groups of countries may have equi-
table access to those orbits and frequencies, taking into account
the special needs of the developing countries and the geographi-
cal situation of particular countries.85
f. Article 48: Installations for National Defense Services
Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to mili-
tary radio installations.... Nevertheless, these installations must,
so far as possible, observe statutory provisions relative to giving
assistance in case of distress and to the measures to be taken to
prevent harmful interference, and the provisions of the Adminis-
trative Regulations concerning the types of emission and the fre-
quencies to be used, according to the nature of the service
performed by such installations.... Moreover, when these instal-
lations take part in the service of public correspondence or other
services governed by the Administrative Regulations, they must,
in general, comply with the regulatory provisions for the conduct
of such services.86
It is not clear from the content of Article 48 if the "entire
freedom" of members' military radio installations extends to
space-based assets. Presumably it does, so in the event of a con-
flict, the operators of a satellite may be able to increase the
probability of its survival by manipulating assigned frequencies
or jamming enemy frequencies. Such actions do not seem be-
yond the plain language of Article 48.
6. The United Nations Charter and the Law of Armed Conflict as
Applied to Satellites
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter specifically states that nothing
in the Charter shall impair a member State's right to individual
or collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack against
it.87 This may reasonably be seen as extending to the space-
based military assets of a nation. A member State may employ
military satellites in its self-defense, provided it is not the initial
aggressor. While this may seem clear cut enough, military ac-
tion must be tempered by the customarily accepted Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC) between nations.88 Further, it is widely
85 Id. art. 44.
86 Id. art. 48.
87 U.N. Charter art. 51.
88 Michel Bourbonniere, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralisation of
Satellites or ius in bello satellitis, in SPACE LAw 528, 529 (Francis Lyall & Paul B.
Larsen eds., 2007).
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accepted under the Hague"9 and Geneva"° Conventions that the
use of military force cannot be indiscriminate, but instead must
be guided by the principles of necessity, discrimination, and
proportionality.9 1
Technology today is sufficiently evolved to permit the use of
successful, anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks. On January 11, 2007,
China tested an ASAT weapon by launching a ground-based, bal-
listic missile that destroyed one of its own non-operational polar
orbit, weather satellites in what was termed a kinetic energy
kill.92 More recently, on February 20, 2008, the United States
employed an SM-3 missile fired from a warship in the Pacific to
destroy a non-operational, spy satellite that was falling out of or-
bit and could potentially have posed a danger to human life on
account of toxic fuel on board. 3 Satellites can be also be de-
stroyed or disrupted by using electromagnetic pulses, radiation
(by exploding a nuclear weapon in space in the vicinity of an
enemy satellite), directed energy weapons (DEWs), (which in-
clude lasers and radio frequencies), and by spoofing orjamming
satellite uplinks and downlinks. 4
a. Legal Justification for ASAT Actions
Clearly the destruction or denial of use of an enemy satellite
confers a military advantage on the attacker because the loss
decreases the enemy's C4ISR (Command, Control, Communica-
tions, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnais-
sance) capability, which is critical on the modern battlefield.
One can certainly argue that a purely military satellite is a legiti-
mate target because it enhances an enemy's war fighting capa-
bility, but what of a dual-purpose satellite? One line of thought
is that dual-purpose assets are legitimate targets, subject to an
89 Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
9 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, Dec. 7, 1979,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
91 See, e.g., Burrus M. Carnahan, Nuclear Weapons, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE
PUBLIC SHOULD KNow 260 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999).
92 See Bourbonniere, supra note 88, at 528; Concern Over China's Missile Test,
BBC NEWS, Jan. 19, 2007, http://tinyurl.com/2ck2zq.
93 Thom Shanker, Missile Strikes a Spy Satellite Falling From its Orbit, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://tinyurl.com/6a3ose.
94 Bourbonniere, supra note 88, at 529-30.
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enhanced obligation by the "belligerent" military commander to
minimize collateral civilian casualties. 9 5
However, consider a dual-purpose satellite that could be used
for mapping, remote sensing, and natural disaster prevention in
addition to more traditional military roles such as targeting, sur-
veillance, and operational communications relay. Military exi-
gencies notwithstanding, should the destruction or denial of
such an asset not be subject to a balancing test to determine if
the benefits from such destruction or denial truly outweigh the
costs? Depending on the percentage capacity of a dual-purpose
satellite used for military purposes, such a satellite could argua-
bly be more analogous to a non-combatant hospital ship than to
an offensive weapon96 and should perhaps be accorded the
same status. Under this analysis, an attack on the satellite, while
technically feasible and maybe even desirable, could fail to rise
to the level of a proportional, discriminate response in cost-ben-
efit terms and should be dispensed with.97
b. Alternative Approaches to Outer Space Military Activities
Another approach to the issue of military activities in outer
space is for States to agree to guidelines that govern such mili-
tary activity, thereby insuring transparency and decreasing the
probability of accidental war.98 Possible guidelines attributed to
the Stimson Center include the following:
95 Id. at 532-33.
96 To the extent that a hospital ship aids a country's war fighting capability by
"renewing" wounded soldiers, it is a valid military target. However, under inter-
national humanitarian law, it provides a humanitarian service for persons hors
d'combat and accordingly, it is granted immunity from attack by the LOAC and by
convention. Convention Between the United States of America and Certain Pow-
ers for the Adaptation to Maritime War Fare of the Principles of the Geneva
Convention of August 22, 1864 (Hague III) arts. I, II, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1827.
97 Current U.S. military policy asserts, not without merit, that denial of service
as opposed to destruction by active kinetic weapons is allowable under the LOAC
and is the preferred tactical method of the U.S. military. E-mail from Philip A.
Meek, supra note 49. Further, the U.S. military questions the existence of "con-
ventional law" in the space law context and asserts the hospital ship analogy
might be out of place because even a dual-use satellite may be legitimately
targeted when used in a military role. Id. The argument presented here, how-
ever, is that a dual-use satellite should be accorded immunity from attack like a
hospital ship to the extent that its military role is indistinguishable from or inex-
tricably intertwined with its civilian role, even if such a policy is somewhat milita-
ily disadvantageous.
98 Paul B. Larsen, Guidelines for Military Activities in Outer Space, IISL-07-E6.5
(2007).
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1. States shall not simulate attacks on satellites of other states,
and shall avoid maneuvers that increase the risk of collision.
2. States shall not use DEWs or ASATs to impair satellites.
3. States shall observe the IADC guidelines on the generation
of space debris and shall not intentionally generate space debris
for offensive use.
4. States shall maintain open channels of communication about
their respective outer space launches and about approaches to
each other's satellites.
5. States shall adopt the 1TU's traffic management regulations
including the use of radio frequencies and orbital slots.
6. States may establish special caution zones by agreement to
avoid collisions.
7. States shall establish a mandatory communication and con-
sultation system to resolve problems that arise.99
B. NON-BINDING SOURCES OF LAW
1. Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)
Guidelines on Space Debris Mitigation'0 0
India is a member of the LADC, "an international forum of
governmental bodies for the coordination of activities related to
the issues of man-made and natural debris in space."'' 1 Con-
cerned with the growing potential for harmful space debris, the
LADC issued guidelines to minimize potential damage to and
from space objects. The guidelines should be of interest to all
nations that hope to launch a satellite into outer space. Specifi-
cally, Section 4 of the Guidelines suggests that each space pro-
gram and project establish a Space Debris Mitigation Plan to
include:
(1) A management plan addressing space debris mitigation
activities
(2) A plan for the assessment and mitigation of risks related to
space debris, including applicable standards
(3) [Measures for minimizing] the hazard related to malfunc-
tions that have a potential for generating space debris
(4) A plan for disposal of the [spacecraft] at end of [the]
mission
(5) Justification of choice and selection when several possibili-
ties exist
99 Id.
100 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm. [LADC], IADC Space Debis
Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-02-01 (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.iadc-
online.org/docs-pub/IADC101502.Mit.Guidelines.pdf.
10, Id. at iii.
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(6) [A c] ompliance matrix addressing the recommendations of
these Guidelines.10 2
Section 5 of the Guidelines goes further. In Section 5.1, the
Guidelines recommend that space objects be designed to limit
the release of debris during normal operations. 0 3 Section 5.2
offers suggestions to minimize on-orbit system destruction, post-
mission system destruction (due to stored energy in potentially
dangerous objects like batteries, residual propellants, and high
pressure vessels), and destruction during operations. 104 Section
5.3 reviews the potential orbit zones available for post-mission
disposal that would minimize the harmful effects of space deb-
ris."°5 Finally, Section 5.4 recommends that operators design a
mission risk profile and perform an accidental collision
probability analysis so as to prepare for efficient, post-mission
disposal in the event of a mishap. 106
2. Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement,
and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
As indicated above in Part III, India is not a signatory to the
MTCR °7 or the Wassenaar Arrangement.108 However, recent
developments indicate that India might be interested in import-
ing U.S. technology to produce or enhance a satellite) 0 9 There-
102 Id. at 3-4.
103 Id. at 4.
104 Id. at 4-5.
105 Id. at 5-6.
106 Id. at 6.
107 See MTCR, supra note 27.
108 See Wassenaar Arrangement, supra note 28.
109 Following India's unilateral nuclear tests in 1998, the U.S. government im-
posed sanctions on India, severely limiting trade and a broad array of cooperative
space initiatives. Kenneth I. Juster, Under Sec'y of Commerce, Keynote Remarks
at the India-United States Conference on Space Science, Applications and Com-
merce: Unleashing the Potential of U.S.-India Civil Space Cooperation (June 22,
2004), http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2004/bangaloreindia6_22.htm. In Sep-
tember 2001, the Bush Administration, after careful review, lifted many of those
restrictions to encourage the development of high technology trade. Id. In No-
vember 2002, the two counties established the U.S.-India High Technology Coop-
eration Group (HTCG) and soon thereafter adopted a set of fourteen principles
to grant India expanded access to U.S. dual-use goods and technologies, consis-
tent with U.S. laws and international commitments. Id. From 2001-2004, the
United States approved over 600 license applications-over 90 percent of dual-
use licenses were approved in 2003. Id. The United States also approved many
more technology sales summarily, stating that no license was necessary. Id. In
2004, U.S. licensing decisions for sophisticated exports to ISRO and its
subordinate entities mirrored this trend. Id. The number of licensing decisions
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fore, MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement, and ITAR"o regimes are
relevant and should be discussed.
a. Missile Technology Control Regime
The MTCR is a voluntary arrangement to stop missile prolifer-
ation and restrict the transfer of missile technology." 1 The re-
gime covers, among other things, ballistic missiles, space launch
vehicles, and GPS satellites used to guide missiles." 2 Enforce-
ment is divided into two categories. Category I items are the
highest risk and are presumed to be ineligible for export li-
censes." 3 Category II items include components, propellants,
material, test equipment, flight instruments and parts that may
be exported on a case-by-case basis.' India has indigenously
developed sophisticated missile systems, including an Intermedi-
ate Range Ballistic Missile with a 2,500 kilometer range, under
its Integrated Guided Missile Development Program
(IGMDP)."' On January 8, 2008, India announced that it was
for ISRO (and its subordinates) increased by 75 percent year-over-year "with the
license approval rate . . . running at approximately 93 percent. In other words,
licenses for exports to ISRO were approved at an even higher rate than for dual-
use exports in general." Id. Also relevant is the Henry J. Hyde United States-
India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 that provides India access
to U.S. civilian nuclear technology and nuclear fuel in exchange for Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on Indian nuclear reactors, which indi-
cates India's need for U.S. technology and its willingness to grant concessions in
exchange. 22 U.S.C. §§ 8001-8008 (2006). National pride apart, Indian reliance
on U.S. technology for its space initiatives is not unrealistic. The practical reali-
ties of budgets and timeframes show that even parties with strong nationalistic
objectives will sometimes need to compromise. Witness the fact that the Euro-
pean Galileo project, conceived as a pan-European project to free the E.U. from
the tyranny of depending on the U.S. GPS system, has now cut a deal whereby
non-Europeans (i.e., the United States) may bid on parts of the project. See e.g.,
Peter B. de Selding, U.S. and Chinese Firms Part of Group Bidding to Operate Galileo,
SPACE NEWS, Mar. 22, 2004, http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive04/
bidarch_032204.html.
110 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120 (2008).
111 MTCR, supra note 27.
112 MTCR, Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers, http://www.
mtcr.info/english/guidetext.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
113 Id.
114 MTCR, MTCR Guidelines, http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidelines.html
(last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
115 Milhollin, supra note 65. The Indian establishment claims that the IGMDP
is an indigenous effort. While this is largely correct, the origins of India's rocket
technology expertise can be traced back to the launches of various sounding
rocket tests by the United States, France, the Soviet Union, and the United King-
dom from the Thumba range in India in the early 1960s. Id.
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voluntarily suspending the IGDMP program due to the ready
availability of foreign development partners. 1 6 Therefore, any
future missile development will be subject to MTCR strictures if
the development partner is a MTCR signatory. This could have
ramifications for India's space ambitions because, legally, gui-
dance and space launch systems come under the MTCR's Cate-
gory I restrictions. The key to getting these items lies in
overcoming the legal presumption of ineligibility for export.
Provided this is successfully done, neither India nor its trading
partners need run afoul of the MTCR.
b. The Wassenaar Arrangement
The Wassenaar Arrangement covers export controls for con-
ventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.' 1 7 The pri-
mary purpose of the Arrangement is to promote transparency,
increase responsibility, and establish reporting requirements for
member States by requiring members to inform all parties to the
Agreement when arms are transferred." 8 The key here lies in
the reporting requirements. Provided member States report
any relevant sale of arms and/or technology to India, the legal
requirements of Wassenaar are met. Conjecture about whether
such a sale might proceed in the face of political opposition or
world opinion is a matter outside the scope of this discussion.
c. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations Regime
ITARs are a set of U.S. government regulations that control
the export and import of defense-related articles and services on
the U.S. Munitions List.11 9 For practical purposes, ITARs dictate
that information and material pertaining to defense and mili-
tary related technologies may only be shared with U.S. persons
unless approval from the U.S. Department of State is received or
a special exemption is used.12 ° U.S. companies can face heavy
fines if the Department of State discovers they have, without ap-
proval or the use of an exemption, exposed non-U.S. persons to
116 India Scraps Integrated Guided Missile Programme, HINDU, Jan. 9, 2008, http://
www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/000200801090301 .htm.
117 See Wassenaar Arrangement, Introduction, http://www.wassenaar.org/in-
troduction/overview.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
118 Id.
119 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2008).
120 Id. §§ 120.1(c)-(d).
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ITAR-protected products or information such as designs, test
data, processes, software code, etc.'
2 1
In 1999, the U.S. Congress made the Department of State re-
sponsible for the export control of U.S. space technology by
placing satellites on the U.S. Munitions List in the same export
category as military weapons. 2 2 The Department of State dis-
charged its mandate through the use of ITARs.
1 23
Two ITARs are most on point with respect to satellite
technology:
(a) Section 120.17(a) (6) specifically includes a launch vehicle or
payload in the definition of an export item under this
regulation. 124
(b) Under the U.S. Munitions List, launch vehicles and space
launch vehicle power plants are classified as Category IV
items. 12 Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment are
accorded their own class under Category XV. 12 6
The ITAR regime is generally acknowledged to be compre-
hensive and exhaustive. 127
121 See e.g., Ryan Zelnio, A Short History of Export Control Policy, SPACE R1v.,Jan. 9,
2006, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/528/1 (reporting that Space Sys-
tems/Loral agreed to pay $20 million and Boeing agreed to pay $32 million in
fines to the U.S. government for export violations).
122 Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-261, § 1513, 112 Stat. 1920 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2778).
123 The Department of Commerce has shared responsibility for this function
because it is required to issue export licenses under the Export Administration
Regulations (EARs). 15 C.F.R. § 730 (2008).
124 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(6).
125 Id. § 121.1.
126 Id.
127 The relevant portions of the statute read as follows:
*(a) Spacecraft, including communications satellites, remote sens-
ing satellites, scientific satellites, research satellites, navigation satel-
lites, experimental and multi-mission satellites.
*Note to paragraph (a): Commercial communications satel-
lites, scientific satellites, research satellites and experimental
satellites are designated as SME only when the equipment is
intended for use by the armed forces of any foreign country.
(b) Ground control stations for telemetry, tracking and control of
spacecraft or satellites, or employing any of the cryptographic items
controlled under category XIII of this subchapter.
(c) Global Positioning System (GPS) receiving equipment specifi-
cally designed, modified or configured for military use; or GPS re-
ceiving equipment with any of the following characteristics:
(1) Designed for encryption or decryption (e.g., Y-Code) of
GPS precise positioning service (PPS) signals;
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(2) Designed for producing navigation results above 60,000
feet altitude and at 1,000 knots velocity or greater;
(3) Specifically designed or modified for use with a null steer-
ing antenna or including a null steering antenna designed to
reduce or avoid jamming signals;
(4) Designed or modified for use with unmanned air vehicle
systems capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a
range of at least 300 km.
(d) Radiation-hardened microelectronic circuits that meet or ex-
ceed all five of the following characteristics:
(1) A total dose of 5x105 Rads (Si);
(2) A dose rate upset threshold of 5x10 8 Rads (Si)/sec;
(3) A neutron dose of lxlO 4 n/cm2 (1 MeV equivalent);
(4) A single event upset rate of lxl0 l' errors/bit-day or less,
for the CREME96 geosynchronous orbit, Solar Minimum
Environment;
(5) Single event latch-up free and having a dose rate latch-up
threshold of 5x10 8 Rads (Si).
(e) All specifically designed or modified systems or subsystems,
components, parts, accessories, attachments, and associated equip-
ment for the articles in this category, including the articles identi-
fied in section 1516 of Public Law 105-261: satellite fuel, ground
support equipment, test equipment, payload adapter or interface
hardware, replacement parts, and non-embedded solid propellant
orbit transfer engines (see also Categories IV and V in this section).
Note: This coverage by the U.S. Munitions List does not include the
following unless specifically designed or modified for military appli-
cation (see § 120.3 of this subchapter): (For controls on these items
see the Export Administration Regulations, Commerce Control List
(15 CFR Parts 730 through 799).)
(1) Space qualified traveling wave tubes (also known as helix
tubes or TWTs), microwave solid state amplifiers, microwave
assemblies, and traveling wave tube amplifiers operating at fre-
quencies equal to or less than 31GHz.
(2) Space qualified photovoltaic arrays having silicon cells or
having single, dual, triple junction solar cells that have gallium
arsenide as one of the junctions.
(3) Space qualified tape recorders.
(4) Atomic frequency standards that are not space qualified.
(5) Space qualified data recorders.
(6) Space qualified telecommunications systems, equipment
and components not designed or modified for satellite uses.
(7) Technology required for the development or production
of telecommunications equipment specifically designed for
non-satellite uses.
(8) Space qualified focal plane arrays having more than 2048
elements per array and having a peak response in the wave-
length range exceeding 300nm but not exceeding 900nm.
(9) Space qualified laser radar or Light Detection and Rang-
ing (LIDAR) equipment.
Id. Category XV(a)-(e).
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All space related items included on the U.S. Munitions List
are subject to a comprehensive review before the Department of
State grants a license for their export.12 It is also accepted that
the ITARs are more restrictive and time consuming than the
EARs or the regime prior to 1999.
What implications do these regimes have for India? As ana-
lyzed above, the MTCR and Wassenaar need not necessarily pre-
clude India from acquiring hardware and technology to further
her space ambitions. Similarly, under ITAR, any Indian request
for space hardware and technology will typically occur at a gov-
ernment-to-government level and will be subject to diplomatic
negotiations. 129 Provided India has the wherewithal to work
through the intricacies of ITAR, there is no legal reason why
such a request will not be met with approval. If past perform-
ance is any indication, the United States will likely look favorably
upon most Indian requests for space technology.'3 °
CONCLUSION
The exigencies of India's security environment dictate that
the Indian Navy acquire a space-based asset sooner rather than
later. There are few constraints, if any, within the law of India
that would hinder the achievement of this goal. Most of the law
that must be complied with comes from international treaties
that India has ratified.
In order to develop the satellite, India must be prepared to
deal with technology acquisition and transfers under the MTCR,
Wassenaar, and ITAR regimes. To deploy the satellite safely, In-
dia must work with the ITU and Registration Conventions and
make every effort to fulfill its obligations with respect to the
IADC Guidelines on Debris Management. Finally, India must
stand willing to grapple with such legal issues as liability for dam-
age to another party's space assets, surface property, or foreign
nationals and the potential for detriment to its security should
the satellite crash on the territory of an unfriendly nation.
From the Charter of the Indian Department of Space it is clear
that the Department is responsible for setting policy and ad-
ministering Indian space activities, so it will be the primary point
of contact for many of these issues in international forums.
ISRO, by contrast, is responsible for the execution of policy, so
128 Id. § 124.15(a).
- SeeJuster, supra note 109.
130 Id.
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the engineering, development, launch, and deployment of the
satellite is likely to be a joint ISRO-Navy project.
Looking ahead, the deployment of this communications satel-
lite is likely to bring a new outer space dimension to the arms
race currently in progress in the IOR. The military history of
the sub-continent bears this out-any tactical action by one
party has resulted in swift, equalizing reaction by other parties.
Other nations can be expected to eventually deploy their own
military satellites for communications, surveillance, and target-
ing. Such actions will increase congestion in space, increase
competition for scarce orbital slots, and potentially increase
space debris. This also raises another question: despite the prin-
ciples enshrined in the OST which call for the use of outer
space for the benefit of all mankind, are we condemned to the
increasing militarization of outer space? The discouraging an-
swer, at least in the near term, appears to be that this is indeed
the path that we are on. In the final analysis, no matter how
necessary a space-based asset may be to security, it detracts from
other, worthier goals. Perhaps it behooves the nations of the
world to recall the words of former U.N. Secretary General U.
Thant: "In modern war, there is no such thing as the victor and
vanquished.... There is only a loser, and the loser is mankind."
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